Some Economic Viewpoints on the Limitation of Liability in Transport by Vlačič, Patrick
PATRICK VLAČIČ
Dr. Juris. Head of Chair of Maritime and Transportation Law, 
Faculty of Maritime and Transportation Studies (University of 
Ljubljana, Slovenia).
SOME ECONOMIC VIEWPOINTS ON THE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN TRANSPORT
1. INTRODUCTION
 The limitation of liability is a legal institute that can be found in 
international conventions as well as in local regulations in differ-
ent countries. It means a deviation from the classical principle of 
law of obligation neminem laedere and full compensation of dam-
ages. A lot has already been written on reasons for the limitation 
of liability in transport. One of the few arguments pro limitation of 
liability that does not regard naphthalene today, is insurability. If I 
avoid the question whether the limitation of liability is an econom-
ic or legal question (which calls to mind the question whether the 
chicken or the egg came first), I can say that the institute has been 
too few times enlightened from the economic side. In the end, the 
figures are those that provide the answer to the questions of rela-
tions among the participants in transport. The article is divided 
into three separate questions that together compose a section of 
the answers on some economic viewpoints on the limitation of li-
ability in transport (cargo owners and carriers). The carriers with 
their liability insurance and the cargo owners with cargo insur-
ance are calculating by taking in consideration the limitation of 
liability. The limitation of liability in the last thirty years has been 
planned precisely in relation to insurance in transport. The second 
important economic viewpoint on the limitation of liability is the 
problem of preserving the value of the amounts of the limitation 
of liability. The fall of the real currency value is their constant 
companion. Because of this fact the carrier is perpetually in a po-
sition of advantage. The third question, which is also problematic 
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regarding the limitation of liability in transport, presents the ques-
tion of different cargo values as related to the uniform limitation 
of liability.
2. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND INSURANCE
 Passengers and cargo are exposed to numerous dangers during 
transport. With cargo transport, it is important from an economic 
point of view that the damage be reduced to the minimal possible 
measure, and that at the same time insurance for damage that ex-
ceeds the commercially acceptable danger for transport users is 
available1. Transport insurance is closely connected to the limita-
tion of liability system. The liability insurance is an important part 
of the cost of the carrier. On the other side, there is the cargo in-
surance or accident insurance that is an important part of the cost 
that is charged to the cargo owner or the passenger. So when the 
carrier charges the cargo owner or passenger the freight or fare, 
the insurance premium for the liability insurance is an important 
parameter in the cost. On the other hand, the liability of the car-
rier is an important parameter in the cargo transport for the cargo 
insurance company. The freight or fare in transport can be rela-
tively lower since the costs of the liability insurance are relatively 
lower-because of the limitation of liability. Insurance policies in 
maritime transport are arranged on the premise that the owner of 
the ship can limit his liability. Insurance companies that offer li-
ability insurance adapt their insurance regimes to the fact that in 
the payment of the insurance premium for the insurance cases they 
are indirectly part of the same benefits as the owner of the ship. 
Buglass2 says that the insurance premiums would be raised by 25 
to 30 percent if the ship owners no longer had protection in the 
form of limitation of liability. When in 1970 in the USA the Water 
Quality Improvement Act was passed, which among other things 
Selvig E., The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice, 
JMLC, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1981, p. 307.
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regulates the liability regarding the pollution of water; it limited 
the liability to fourteen million American dollars. That should 
have been the amount that the insurance market could bear at that 
moment. Regarding the height of the amounts of the limitation of 
liability, two concepts3 collided in the 70’s. The first one was the 
concept of fortune de mer. This concept tries to tie together the 
limitation amount and the ship value. The defenders of the sec-
ond concept believed that it is necessary to withdraw from that, 
that the liability is bound in rem and that it is necessary to take 
insurability as a lead in defining the amounts of the limitation of 
liability. The latter concept has prevailed. This can be seen from 
two points in the 1976 LLMC4. The amounts of the limitation of 
liability have increased essentially and the cases where the person 
responsible has no right to limit are rare. The defenders of the 
limitation of liability affirm that it is possible to insure the liability 
only for a realistic insurance limit (the insurance that is accessible 
at reasonable prices or expenses). Insurance companies today as-
sert that the limitation of liability is a necessity because it ensures 
economic safety and foresight5. 
 Limited liability does not render compensation for the entire 
damage possible for the cargo owners. It is clear that the cargo 
owners urgently need better protection from economic conse-
quences of cargo loss and damage. Greater economic safety6 is 
offered by the cargo insurance that plays a leading role in “com-
pensation of the damage” in cargo transport. In cargo insurance 
the principle holds true that the insurance company compensates 
Buglass L. J., Limitation of Liability from a Marine Insurance Viewpoint, Tulane 
Law Review, Volume 53, No 4, 1979, p. 1364.
Berlingieri F. (editor), The Travaux Préparatoires of the LLMC Convention, 1976 
and of the Protocol of 1996, CMI, Antwerpen, 2000, p. 138.
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims was adopted in London 
in 1976.
Honka H., New Carriage of Goods by Sea: The Nordic Approach Including Compa-
risons with Some Other Jurisdictions, Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, 
Åbo Akademi University, Åbo 1997, p. 70.
Selvig E., supra 1, p. 307.
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for the damage (it would be right to say: pays insurance benefits) 
even or especially if the carrier is responsible for the damage. This 
has to be understood so that the insurance company compensates 
for the damage first to the insured person, the cargo owners and 
then in the recourse process it demands the reimbursement of the 
paid amount of the compensation from the carrier. Because it 
would be too hard for the carriers to pay the damages caused, they 
insure their liability. The maritime carriers insure their liability in 
P&I insurance companies (special mutual insurance companies). 
This is a particularity in maritime transport because carriers in 
other transport branches do not insure the liability in special insur-
ance companies but in classical insurance companies in the open 
insurance market7. Irrespective of this particularity, we can talk 
about the overlap of cargo insurances and liability insurance in 
transport. Where it comes to such an overlap, a question immedi-
ately emerges - to what extent will the insurance company that has 
taken the cargo insurance with the cargo owner cover the damage 
to the cargo and to what extent will the P&I club (or the other 
insurance company that insures the liability). Several parameters 
influence this relation. The decision whether the insurance com-
pany of the cargo insurance will pay the insurance benefit for the 
damage to the cargo, which will generally happen, the decision 
for an eventual recourse procedure against the carrier (or his in-
surance company), the success in recourse procedures and cases 
where the damages to cargo emerge but the carrier can’t be held 
responsible for such damages. In the latter, we can count cases 
of damage to cargo for which the carrier for an indefinite reason 
is not responsible (e.g. Act of God, if the transport is one where 
there is a strict liability of the carrier, as also cases that are known 
only to maritime transport: error in navigation or management of 
the ship and the fire statute). In cargo insurance it has to be kept 
in mind that also numerous cases of damage to cargo exist that are 
not covered by the insurance and the particularity of short distance 
More about liability insurance in the common law see Colvinaux R., The Law of 
Insurance, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1984, pp. 400–420
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transports. In other words, over a short distance the cargo owners 
very rarely conclude cargo insurance. 
 A very important aspect of transport insurance is also the extent 
of the cover8. Usually insurance in transport does not cover all of 
the damages that can originate from the transport of cargo. The 
extents of insurance coverages that are offered by the insurance 
companies can be very different, besides the fact that the content 
of the insurance contract is also in the autonomy of the parties of 
the contract. The consequence is that there are many cases of dam-
age that cargo owners suffer in which the insurance company is 
not bound to pay out the insurance benefit. Usually the insurance 
company pays out the insurance benefit for physical damage, for 
cargo damage and loss of cargo. Insurance usually does not cover 
different indirect damage (e.g., loss of market share) or damages 
due to delay in the delivery. Even if it is damage to the cargo or a 
loss of cargo it often happens that the insurance company does not 
cover all of the damage incurred. For such states there are more 
reasons. Usually the cargo insurance does not cover damages that 
are a consequence of war risks but only that damage that is a con-
sequence of civil risks. War risks are included only by a special 
agreement. The same goes for risks such as authority measures, 
civil commotions, strikes and the like. The insurance companies 
offer covering extents that represent different levels of protection. 
The clients decide by themselves the extent of the coverage when 
estimating the eventual level of risk and premium height that is 
available on the insurance market.
 Cargo owners in maritime transport decide very often for mini-
mal insurance coverage in cargo insurance. Namely, the price of 
such insurance is 1/3 or even less of the premium for all coverages 
that are usually offered by the insurance companies. In maritime 
transport this was the free from particular average (FPA) clause 
in accordance with the old S.G. policy9 that today is almost never 
used. Today instead of the FPA, the MAR10 policy along with In-
Selvig E., supra 1, p. 308, 309.8
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stitute Cargo Clauses is used. Institute Cargo Clauses (C)11 offer 
coverage for the same risks as the FPA once did. It regards the loss 
of or damage to the subject-matter insured reasonably attributable 
to fire or explosion, vessel or craft being stranded grounded sunk 
or capsized, overturning or derailment of land conveyance, col-
lision or contact of vessel craft or conveyance with any external 
object other than water, discharge of cargo at a port of distress 
or the loss of or damage to the subject-matter insured caused by 
general average sacrifice and jettison. Such insurance offers cov-
ering only for risks that derive from a severe accident of the ship. 
Damages that originate from other reasons (e.g. theft, handling of 
the goods), are not taken into consideration. Also on parity CIF12 
it suffices if the vendor insures such (the lowest) coverage of risks. 
Therefore, as the cargo owners usually decide for the narrowest 
covering of risks, the liability and the limitation of liability of the 
carrier is very important for them.
 The liability regime of the carrier greatly influences the relation 
between the burden that in the balancing of the risks in transport 
on one side carry the insurance companies that offer cargo insur-
The policy was developed in England where it has been used by Lloyd’s from 1779 
until recently. With the policy S. G. (Ship and Goods) the ship and the cargo were 
insured. The use of this policy has died away recently. It was replaced by the modern 
MAR policy - its own model was also made within the UNCTAD. Pirs A., Tran-
sportno zavarovanje, Fakulteta za pomorstvo on promet, Portoroz, 2000, p. 108.
MAR is an abbreviation for New Marine Policy Form. In comparison with the S. 
G., the MAR policy does not contain insurance general terms and conditions that 
are entirely comprised in the Institute Clauses. Taking into account that from the 
field of transport insurance no convention was accepted, the UNCTAD went on 
with its attempt. It has prepared two samples of clause sets, namely two versions 
for hull insurance and three versions for cargo insurance. The Institute of London 
Underwrites has quickly reacted to the UNCTAD action and exchanged the old S. 
G. policy with the modern MAR policy so that it would not lose the world primacy 
in marine insurances.
Pirs A., Transportno zavarovanje, Supra 9, pp. 109 and 131.
The Institute Clauses are named after the Institute of London Underwrites which 
was founded in 1884. Institute of London Underwrites has a very important role 
in the standardization of the insurance terms and conditions for marine insurances. 
Ibidem, pp. 109 and 131.
See also ICC: Incoterms 2000, http://www.iccwbo.org/index incoterms.asp.
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ance and on the other the insurance companies that offer liability 
insurance. This antagonism is especially felt in maritime transport 
where the cargo insurance and the liability insurance markets are 
divided. In property insurances (non-marine) the right of the insur-
ance company to recourse against the party that caused the damage 
or his insurance company is usually very limited. But this is not 
the case in transport insurances and for the recourse of cargo in-
surance companies against liability insurance companies. Selvig13 
says that the reason for this condition is that in marine insurance 
the insurance companies regularly sue in recourse procedures. 
Recourse actions play an important role in transport insurance be-
cause the loss ratio of each maritime carrier is the basis of defining 
his P&I premium. The arrangement of the burden between the car-
go insurance companies and the insurance companies that insure 
liability is mostly dependent on the success in recourse actions of 
cargo insurance companies. In maritime transport the English and 
partially also the Scandinavian P&I clubs have practically closed 
(incapacitated the access of other insurance companies) the mar-
ket of liability insurance of maritime carriers.
 The relation between cargo insurance and liability insurance is 
defined by the liability and limitation of liability so that the height 
of the premiums of the cargo insurance companies and the insur-
ance companies that insure the liability depends on the attribution 
of the damage burden on the cargo. This is most obvious in the 
case of the error in navigation or management of the ship and the 
fire statute along with which one could also transfer the same rule 
to a higher or lower limitation of liability of the carrier. Most of 
the damages to the cargo that are the result of an error in naviga-
tion or management of the ship and the fire statute are born by the 
cargo insurance companies. The cargo insurance company cannot 
refund the paid insurance benefit from the liable person (carrier) 
in recourse actions because of Hague or Hague Visby rules. At 
the moment when the cargo insurance companies would have the 
possibility to raise part of the return of the paid insurance ben-
13 Selvig E., supra 1, p. 311.13
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efits in recourse procedures, they could lower the premiums for 
insurance. The opposite would come to raising the P&I premiums 
because the P&I clubs would have to carry a greater burden in 
paying out for the liability insurance as they have it now. Selvig 
says that out of the liability insurance the P&I clubs in Europe 
cover approximately 10 per cent of the aggregated paid out insur-
ance benefits for damages on cargo (in the USA that share should 
be 20 per cent)14. The remaining share burdens the cargo insur-
ance companies. Each stricter relation towards the liability of the 
carrier will show up in an increased percentage of the burden for 
the insurance companies. To what change it will come to is hard 
to calculate because the distribution of the burden is influenced 
by numerous parameters of which many are subjective. One such, 
which is dependent on the will of the cargo insurance companies, 
is deciding on recourse actions (i.e. whether the cargo insurance 
company will sue the carrier).
 The relation between cargo insurance and liability insurance 
has an additional extension in that there are different interests 
between developed countries and countries of the third world. 
This is true in spite of the fact that cargo insurance companies as 
liability insurance companies own the capital in developed coun-
tries. The insurance market is complaining that the liability of the 
carriers is more and more rigorous15.  The developed countries are 
complaining that in the United Nations non-maritime countries 
that defend only the interest of cargo owners overrule traditional 
maritime countries. The consequence of such overrules were the 
Hamburg rules (United Nations Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, 1978) that precisely for this reason never really 
began to shine in full splendor. As this was not enough, the devel-
oped countries warn that it would seem that also the courts of law 
are more and more disinclined to honor the institute of limitation 
The paid out insurance benefits for the liability for the damage caused on the cargo 
usually represents from 1/3 to 2/5 of all insurance benefits that the P&I clubs pay 
out. 
Buglass L. J., supra 2, p. 1365.
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of liability. This is especially true for courts of law in the United 
States of America. Every time the relation towards the liability of 
the carrier becomes more rigorous or when the liability limits rise, 
the insurance companies have to calculate the figures, namely the 
coverage that they can offer as the amount of the premiums for the 
coverage.
 When we speak of reasons for preserving the system of limita-
tion of liability in transport, it is often said that each change of 
the liability regime influences the insurance expenses in transport 
and the height of the freight and fare. Such arguments have also 
been used by the opponents while accepting the Hamburg rules.16 
They were against higher amounts of limited liability and the 
revocation of the error in navigation or management of the ship 
and the changes in fire statute. Selvig17 says that the debate has 
proceeded without even slightly indicative information on the ex-
tent and meaning of separate expense items, devolving into a mere 
exchange of opinions that were based upon preconceptions and 
beliefs, and neither side has succeeded in convincing the other. 
Undoubtedly the liability of the carriers, the height of the insur-
ance benefits and height of the freights are mutually connected. 
The mechanism of mutual influence has to be judged taking into 
account what has been written on the relation between cargo in-
surance and liability insurance. The defenders of conserving the 
limitation of liability say that the premiums for the liability insur-
ance would raise more than the cargo insurance premiums would 
fall. The reason is that we have to count on expenses of recourse 
procedures of cargo insurance companies against insurance com-
panies that insure liability. These expenses would be higher than 
now because there would be more recourse procedures and the 
net effect would be smaller than the increase of the sums that the 
liability insurance companies would pay. Because the insurance 
companies that insure liability would have to pay frequently and 
See also Sweeney J. C., UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation 
Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods, (1991) 3 J.M.L.C. 511.
Selvig E., supra 1, p. 315.
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more than they do now, there would be a rise of premiums, mean-
ing that the carriers would charge more. The final effect would be 
a higher rise of freight costs than the reduction of premiums for 
cargo insurance. From this one could assume that the transport for 
the cargo owners with a higher liability would be more expensive 
than it is today.
 Given that conclusion the expenses of the insurance with the 
smallest coverage (clause 1 in connection of the Institute clauses 
C) would represents the usual 0.3 per cent value of the cargo 
which corresponds to 5 per cent on average of liner freights, pre-
suming that the liner freights usually amount to 6 per cent of the 
cargo value. Selvig18 is sure that the increase of the liability limits 
would influence these relations, but it should be clear already from 
the figures that this effect is reduced to a relatively small part of 
the freight. The next important finding is that although the cargo 
insurance companies work in an exceptionally competitive envi-
ronment, 75 per cent of paid-in premiums are meant for paying 
out the insurance benefits, 20 per cent for operation expenses and 
5 per cent is profit (in the USA this relation is worse: 50 per cent 
of the premiums go for paying out insurance benefits, 33 per cent 
for the operation expenses and 17 per cent is profit)19. In P&I clubs 
there is a difference, they operate as mutual insurance companies 
with relatively low expenses and they spend 85–90 per cent of 
all of the paid-in premiums for the paying out of the insurance 
benefits. Because of these findings Selvig’s20 opinion on the judg-
ment, if a more rigorous regime of Hamburg rules from the one of 
the Hague rules would make the transport of goods by sea more 
expensive, is that this would not happen or that the rise would 
be modest21. The P&I clubs insure different risks for shipowners; 
liability is just one of them (it includes from 1/3 to 2/5 of all the 
claims for the payment). The rise of the payment to cargo insur-
Ibidem, p. 316.
Kihlbom , The Hague Rules and the UNCITRAL Draft, Scandinavian Insurance 
Quarterly, 31, 1977, pp. 32– 34 and Cargo Liability Study, U. S. Department of 
Transportation, resumed after Selvig, supra 1, p. 316, note 59.
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ance companies in recourse procedures would not necessarily 
mean a rise of premiums. It is being established that between the 
raising of the liability, raising of the P&I premiums and freights 
there is nothing automatic. The value of his statement from 1981 
has only an academic value today because the majority of goods 
transported by sea are still being transported on the basis of the 
Hague and Hague Visby rules. His appraisals must be even more 
critically judged in connection with an eventual unlimited liability 
of the carrier. With an unlimited liability of the carrier the insur-
ance benefits would rise much more than they should in view of 
somewhat higher limits in the Hamburg rules compared with the 
Hague and Hague Visby rules.
 Each change of liability of the carrier is connected with a 
changed allocation of risk and the payment of the expenses in 
form of insurance for these risks. The insurance market is much 
intertwined and as cargo insurance companies as P&I clubs are 
fighting a ruthless battle for changing the existent state. The insur-
ance market functions on the basis of stabilized relations in which 
it is known how many risks each of the participants in transport 
bears. In particular, the relations in maritime transport seem fixed. 
It is a fact that the maritime carriers are a coherent group when it 
comes to their interests. At the same time we have to see the fact 
that the eternal antagonism between carriers and cargo owners is 
also the antagonism between the developed countries and the tra-
ditional transport countries on one side and the countries that are 
merely the cargo owners, i.e. the countries of the third world, on 
the other. The countries of the third world are in this relation par-
ticularly in an uncomfortable position because they do not have 
influence in liner conferences that decide prices of the transport in 
liners and are not even owners of important insurance companies. 
Their influence and power are actually shown only through the 
Selvig E., supra 1, p. 316.
Selvig’s evaluations have been made with the introduction of the Hamburg rules and 
when questions appeared about what the influence of raising the amount of limited 
liability will be.
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hope that the new regulation of carriage of goods by sea, which 
is being prepared by the UNCITRAL and CMI, will tilt the scales 
of burden allocation of expenses and risks somewhat away from 
them, away from the transport users. The second part of this hope 
is connected with the hope that the developed countries will ac-
cept a new system of carriage of goods by sea. Till then insur-
ance is one of the most firm “concrete” binding relations between 
transport users and carriers. For an average evaluation of the 
changed relations between transport users and carriers it would be 
necessary to make an extended economic analysis; otherwise the 
discussions on unlimited liability in transport are of an academic 
nature. It would seem preposterous that the present arrangement 
would be adequate for carriers as well as transport users. The first 
pay low insurance benefits for liability insurance, the second with 
a relatively small number of accidents in comparison to all the 
goods shipped, pay lower aggregated freights as they would if the 
liability was unlimited.
3. THE PROBLEM OF CONSERVING THE VALUE OF 
THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AMOUNTS
 A special problem in connection with the limitation of liability 
has always been the amounts to which the liability is limited or the 
conservation of the value of these amounts. There is no super na-
tional currency in which the amount of the limited liability22 could 
be expressed in conventions. Almost every country has its own 
national currency23. Currencies are based on different fiscal phi-
losophies. That is why it is urgent that a unit in which the amounts 
of the limitations are expressed has the characteristics that can 
effectively perform its function. The unit should be widely ac-
cepted, stable on international markets, easy to convert into local 
currencies and, most important, it should have a unified and uni-
versally accepted internal value and stability. The unit should be 
as immune as possible to fluctuations. It is impossible, of course, 
Tobolewski A., Monetary Limitations of Liability in Air Law, Montreal, 1986, pp. 
166, 167.
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to create a unit immune to all “illnesses” that beset currencies, but 
it is essential that it be as stable as possible and that its changes 
can be anticipated. 
 Devaluation necessarily influences the collapse of the rela-
tions between the participants in transport businesses. The drop 
of currency value always redounds to the carriers’ benefit. Selvig 
warned in 1981 that the amounts of the limitation from the Hague 
rules in that year are 1/10 of those from 1924 and 2/5 of those from 
the Hague Visby rules24. The Hamburg rules contained, already at 
their acceptance, amounts of limited liability that represented 60 
per cent of the limit value of the Hague Visby rules, calculated in 
real value25. With time the amounts in real numbers were becom-
ing lower and lower. Support for this can be found in numerous 
protocols to conventions that tried to balance the collapsed rela-
tions between participants in transport. The quandary of such 
protocols is in that that they have to be ratified by the countries 
in order to enter into force. Especially in such dispersed users of 
transport as passengers are there is no cognizance that the relation 
has collapsed and so there is also no pressure on local authorities 
to ratify some protocol. The authorities in their bureaucratic cir-
cumstances many times simply do not perform the procedure of 
ratification and so low amounts of limited liability are conserved 
as some natural injustice. When they defined the limits in English 
pounds while preparing the Hague rules, many countries were not 
content. That is why Article 9 of the Hague rules provides that 
the countries in which the pound is not a monetary unit have the 
right of translating the sums indicated in pounds into those of their 
own monetary system. Although the English pound was bound to 
gold26 in the Hague rules, it came to very different amounts of lim-
The number of currencies has diminished on a global scale with the introduction of 
the Euro but only a decade before the introduction of the Euro, as a consequence of 
the collapse of some of the federal countries (SFRY, USSR, CSSR); numerous new 
national currencies were introduced.
Selvig E., supra 1, p. 301.
Ibidem, p. 307.
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itation27 in the countries that were parties to the Hague rules. Some 
countries that have defined the amounts in the local currency have 
bound the latter to gold; the others did not do that28. Tetley29 says 
that the meaning of 100 English pounds in the Hague rules is not 
clear. The United Kingdom left the gold standard in 1926. In 1950, 
with the so called Gold Clause Agreement that was accepted by 
the British maritime law association, they have raised this amount 
to 200 English pounds if some conditions were fulfilled. One of 
these was that the action was brought in the United Kingdom. The 
amount was raised once more with the agreement in 1977, to 400 
English pounds.
 To the introduction of the gold franc Poincaré in conventions 
as a way of defining the amount of the limitation of liability came 
naturally30. The gold franc Poincaré is a currency that was intro-
duced in France on the 25th of June, 192831. It got its name after the 
French financial minister and later first minister Raymond Poin-
caré and has stabilized French currency with the gold franc Poin-
Gold has prevailed over silver in financial transactions only in the period after the 
19th century. The years from 1900 to 1914 are known as “the golden years of the gold 
standard” (the same goes also for the years 1925 to 1931). The gold standard has 
functioned on the basis of two premises, namely the currency of each country was 
the equivalent of a quantity of gold and financial authority of the country have bound 
themselves to exchange the paper currency for gold whenever on a fixed exchange 
relation. So through gold also exchange relations were defined between individual 
currencies of different countries. When they defined the amounts of the limitation 
in pounds in the Hague rules that was an adequate way for defining the quantities of 
gold as values for the amounts of the limitation of liability.
Tobolewski A., supra 22, pp. 168, 169.
Selvig has written already (1980) that the amounts of the limitation of liability for 
the transport of goods by sea were very low and has warned of the problem that the 
amounts of the limitation of liability are very different from the lowest in Spain (65 
American dollars) to the highest in Switzerland (1.455 American dollars). The rea-
son was that the countries have defined the amounts in national currencies and that 
the different level of inflation has lead to such high differences. Most of the coun-
tries have the limitations of liability defined in limits between 300 and 600 American 
dollars. Selvig E., supra 1, pp. 301 and 326.
Somers J., Legislation of Loss and Damage, Which Changes Are to Be Expected 
with Regard to International Legislation, script, p. 6.
Tetley W., Marine Cargo Claims, Third Edition, International Shipping Publications 
BLAIS, Montreal, 1988, p. 890, note 76.
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caré. The former Germinal francs (silver coins) were exchanged 
for coins of an aluminous-bronze alloy. Precisely because of the 
introduction of the gold franc Poincaré, France better survived the 
great recession at the end of the twenties of the last century32. The 
value is 65.5 milligrams of gold of 900/1000 fineness. It seemed 
that the definition of the amounts of the limitation of liability in 
the gold equivalent would be an excellent decision. Evan if certain 
currency lost its value, it has lost it in relation to the gold that has 
conserved its value. Nevertheless gold was not a super national 
currency that would be immune to economic law and could be 
dealt independently of other economic happenings33. Economic 
lines of force are different in countries and the buying power of 
the currency and gold is dependent on numerous factors that are 
not of merely economic nature but also political and psychologi-
cal. Defining the amounts in gold has not meant only inflation but 
also disproportion between countries because the buying power of 
gold in countries is different and varies a lot through time34. A spe-
cial quandary was caused by the so called double-track gold mar-
ket. Till 1971 the relation of 35 American dollars for an ounce of 
gold was valid. This falsely maintained value was surpassed by far 
by the market value of gold35. This problem36 was not perceived on 
accepting the CLC 1969 when it was not sure which value of the 
gold to take to calculate the amounts of the limitations. The inter-
pretation of the conventions that contained amounts of limitations 
in units bound to the gold was unpredictable. The courts were in 
doubt as to which value of the gold to use: the official37 or market38 
See also Tobolewski A, supra 22, p. 170, note 5.
Tetley W., Marine Cargo Claims, supra 29, p. 878.
http://www.geocities.com/Paris/Rue/2430/n a franc.htm.
Tobolewski A., supra 22, p. 174.
We come upon an interesting finding if we look at the changing of the buying power 
of gold in separate countries from 1929 to 1949. The calculation is made taking into 
account the buying power of 125,000 gold francs Poincaré. In some countries it has 
increased: Australia + 49.8 per cent, United Kingdom + 38.7 per cent, South Africa 
+ 31. 4 per cent, Norway + 27.7 per cent and Argentina + 25.6 per cent, in some the 
buying power has decreased: Belgium - 74.6 per cent, France - 72.5 per cent, Brazil 
- 23.5 per cent, ex CSSR - 20.7 per cent.  Tobolewski A., p. 175, 176.
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value. The judges began to search the ratio legis of the limitation 
of liability, which did not provide the answer. They began reading 
the travaux preparatoires of the conventions and the conclusions 
to which they came were not uniform. The misty horizons were 
cleared by the IMF decision which has officially left the value of 
gold as a relevant factor in international relations or transactions 
in 1978.
 After the breakdown of the Brettonwood system a search has 
begun to find a new way of defining the amounts of the limitation 
of liability. The gold franc Poincaré was replaced by the modern 
SDR. IMF established SDR39 (special drawing rights) in 1969. It 
was thought up as a support for the Brettonwood systems fixed 
exchange rate when gold and the dollar could no longer perform 
the function of reserves successfully. Because of the relatively 
slower production of gold and the low confidence in the American 
dollar there were problems of international liquidity40. The SDR 
should become the new mean for reserves under the patronage 
of the IMF. Only a few years later there was a breakdown of the 
Brettonwood system and most of the currencies have gone to the 
sliding exchange rate. This change and some other happenings on 
international capital markets have reduced the necessity to use 
SDR, so it never actually fulfilled the historic function that some 
predicted for it. The role of SDR today is very limited. Besides 
being the unit of account of the IMF and an international mean for 
reserves it serves also as binding for some local currencies for the 
exchange rate and as unit of account in transport conventions.
 At first the value of the SDR was defined as the equivalent of 
Ibidem, pp. 178, 179.
Ibidem, pp. 180, 181.
In the case S. S. Horland v President Angot the court has used the official price of 
gold. More about this in Asser T. M. C., p. 645.
In the case Olympic Airways v Zacopoulos (IATA ACLR No. 461) the court has used 
the market price of gold.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.
Babic M., Medunardona ekonomija, Privredni vjesnik, Zagreb, 1989, p. 285.
35
36
37
38
39
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0.888671 grams of gold of 900/1000 fineness, which was at that 
time the equivalent of one American dollar. After the Brettonwood 
system breakdown in 1973, the IMF redefined the value of the 
SDR in 1974 as the basket of sixteen currencies. Sixteen curren-
cies have been reduced to five as of 1981: the American dollar, the 
German mark, the English pound, the Japanese yen and the French 
franc. The German mark and the French franc were replaced by 
the euro on 1 January, 1999, and today the SDR is composed of 
currencies in the following relation41:
• American dollar (44 per cent),
• Euro (34 per cent),
• Japanese yen (11 per cent),
• English pound (11 per cent).
 These currencies and relations will be valid till the end of 2010. 
Considering the value of these four currencies, the value of the 
SDR is calculated daily regarding the value of the currencies in 
the London foreign currency market at 12.0042. If the London mar-
ket is closed, New York is used and if also the latter does not work 
it is calculated by comparison with the Frankfurt foreign currency 
market.
 For the countries that are not members of the IMF or for which 
regulations do not allow use of the SDR, the gold franc Poincaré 
is still used, although the conventions (for instance, Article 23 of 
the Montreal convention) do not actually name it, rather speak 
only of the monetary unit that is worth 65.5 milligram of gold of 
900/1000 fineness. The relation between the SDR and the gold 
franc Poincaré is defined in the rate of one SDR to fifteen gold 
franc Poincaré.
 One currency must be mentioned that is used only in road 
transport (CMR and CVR) and inland navigation (CLN and CVN) 
– the gold Germinal franc, the value of which is 10/31 of gram of 
The currencies and relations were last revised on 1st January 2006, with validity for 
the next 5 years. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05309.htm.
The SDR value was 1.207800 euro at the beginning of the year 2006. http://
www.imf.org/external/np/fin/rates/rms mth.cfm?SelectDate=01%2F01%2F2006&r
eportType=CVSDR&arch=1.
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For the history of the Germinal franc see: http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/
actualites/celebrations2003/francgerminal.htm.
The study on the influence of inflation on the Athens convention was prepared by 
Erik Rosag: http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/insurance/inflatio.doc.
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gold of 900/1000 fineness. The Germinal franc was used in France 
from 1803 to 191443. The protocols from 1978 have defined the 
amounts of the limitation of liability of the CMR and CVR in 
SDR. The legislation in the Republic of Slovenia has also defined 
the amounts of the limitation of liability in SDR.
 The SDR also did not successfully perform its task. Although 
it successfully amortizes the change of value between singular 
currencies, it is not immune to general inflation44. An elegant and 
modern solution to the problem of the amounts of the limitation of 
liability has been delivered by the Montreal convention. A check 
of the amounts of the limitation of liability is made every 5 years. 
If it is ascertained that the inflation factor is higher than 10 per 
cent, the depositary officially notifies the contractual countries on 
the change of the limitation of liability (the measure for the level 
of inflation that is used in defining the factor of the inflation is a 
balanced average of the yearly levels of increasing and decreas-
ing indexes of movement of the retail trade prices of the countries 
whose currencies compose the SDR). Each such variation begins 
to be valid for 6 months notification of the contractual countries. 
If the majority of the contractual countries do not agree with the 
change in three months, the change is not valid and the depository 
presents the matter to the contractual countries at a meeting. One 
third of the member countries can propose a change of amounts 
before the 5 years if the inflation factor exceeds 30 per cent of the 
precedent change of amounts or beginning of the validation of the 
convention. The depository notifies the member countries of the 
beginning of the validation of each variation. In such a way it will 
be significantly easier to change and adjust the amounts with infla-
tion. No active treatment will be demanded from the countries for 
the enforcement of the adjustment but active treatment will be de-
manded if a country will want to prevent the adjustment. The mere 
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fact that it will be an adjustment will exceptionally limit the cases 
in which the countries will be against the raising of the amounts of 
the limitation of liability.
4. DIFFERENT VALUES OF CARGO AND UNIFIED LIMI-
TAION OF LIABILITY
 In the limitation of liability the fact that the values of the car-
gos that are transported are very different has to be considered. 
The limitation of liability is valid (non)discriminatory, regardless 
of the value of the cargo. The objections are that the sender can 
declare the value but this is shameless ignorance. The declaration 
of value was relatively rare historically because the senders were 
afraid of high customs duties, luxury tax or other taxes45. The 
transport users today do not decide on the declaration of value 
mainly because of the higher freight. The fact that the transport 
conventions define a unified limitation of liability for different 
cargo values can be criticized for at least two reasons. The first is 
that only the shipowner business interest is taken into account, the 
second is that the limitation burden goes primarily to those send-
ers that suffer cargo damage that exceeds the limits. Those who do 
not exceed these points, in other words, get their damage entirely 
compensated (or because their cargo is less valuable, or because it 
is less damaged).
 Regarding the amounts of the general limitation of liability in 
maritime transport they originate out of French system (abandon-
ment) or the English system that has taken the average value of the 
ship for the amount of the limitation of liability upon the accept-
ance of the Merchant Shipping Act46 in England. A totally different 
story involves the amounts of limitation of liability for the damage 
to the cargo regarding the package or unit limitation. The amounts 
of the limited liability are not a result of a deep economic-juridical 
analysis. If we read the travaux préparatoires of different con-
ventions we find that the amounts are a consequence of practice, 
Berlingieri F. (editor), The Travaux Préparatoires of the Hague and ot the Hague-
Visby Rules, CMI, Antwepren, 1997, pp. 446, 447.
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spiced with negotiations at codification conferences. At codifica-
tion conferences we traditionally avoid economic analyses that 
would provide an answer to the question as to what adequate lim-
its are. Is the reason that the question is juridical and not economic 
or perhaps that both sides (carriers and cargo owners) are “afraid” 
of the result?
5. INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION
 The present discussion is actually a call for the judgment of the 
limitation of liability in transport with the inclusion of economic 
parameters. It would be interesting to see what would happen if, 
while accepting a new instrument on carriage of goods by sea that 
proceeds under the patronage of UNCITRAL and CMI in defin-
ing the amounts for package or unit or kilo limitation, we would 
dispose with an economic study of influences of different amounts 
on relations between participants in transport. Regarding the de-
crease of the real value of the currencies, the Montreal convention 
has provided a good solution by which taking into account those 
countries that are against the amounts increase will at least to 
some extent decrease the negative effect of the decrease of value 
of the currencies and thereby improve the position of the carrier 
in relation to the transport users (all of this of course to the loss of 
the consumer).
Merchant Shipping Act established the foundations of the English limitation system 
regarding the average ship value in 1854 and 1862 respectively. See Thomas M., 
British Concepts of Limitation of Liability, Tulane Law Review, Volume 53, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, 1979, p. 1208.
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